Much has been said lately about Somaliland (1) , but hardly ever does any writer focuses on the pros and cons that may possibly come with the birth of a recognized independent Somaliland. As we are aware of, a peaceful Southern Somalia would be much better off and less longing for the union than Somaliland. That is if the significance and all common interests embedded in Somali unity are ignored and the nation diverges into two entities. After all, in Somalia most of the resources are located in the South.
Somaliland is a self-declared state that lacks international recognition and claims to represent the communities of Northern Somalia, regardless of one's clan wish of self-determination or lack of it and/or political association. That assertion has yet to be convincing to the majority in the North let alone those in the South. Apart from the numerically smaller clans, there are basically three major communities in Northern Somalia (2) namely; Samaroon and Ciise (westerners 3 ) who reside in the west, Isaaq in the center and Harti (easterners 4 ) in the east. Present day Somaliland was coined together in May of 1991 following the fall of Siad Barre's government. At a conference organized in Burao by heavily armed Somali National Movement (SNM) militia, the Isaaq clan unilaterally declared secession of the ex-Northern Region from the rest of the Democratic Republic of Somalia.
It is a self-evident that Somaliland has achieved a relatively functioning system of government in so far as resuming peace and a semblance of stability is concerned. Other regions, with the exception of Puntland , which enjoys a comparable peace and stability, should emulate this achievement; And Somaliland should be commended; However, if the agenda is conquering others for expanding Isaaq clan authority and its domain of political dominance, and ignoring facts on the ground, then the centerpiece of Somaliland's stability will fall into an irreversible path that would lead to chaos and destruction. Likewise the Somaliland rulers' motto of “Submission by a brute force” may in the long run drag it into a civil war to its own detriment.
The driving forces, for the secession ideology among the Isaaq , are led by a handful of zealots, while the rest of the population favor remaining with the republic, provided that federalism based on a fair system of power sharing and wealth distribution is established.
Somaliland purports to be an “oasis of democracy.” However, the irony to this is there are non- Isaaq representatives in the Somaliland government who are virtually second-class citizens in Hargeysa . They are neither in the decision-making loop, nor have the support of the people and regions that they claim to represent. To support this, we need not refer to the past. Suffice to say that the recent case of the unfortunate young girl Samsam Axmed Ducaale ( Samsam vs . Somaliland) attests to all.
Her own maternal uncle, a Minister in the Somaliland administration, could not bail her out while her ill-fated investigation was underway. At first, the Minister denied that she was related to him, but he later admitted his familial relationship with the abused child, only after the case surfaced and caught in the eyes of the human rights organizations. It is reported that he was afraid of backlash and repercussions. Indeed, this is a disgrace for all involved parties and an insult to Somali cultural mores as well. In fact, this case has already done an irreparable damage to Somaliland. On one hand it exposed to the world their inherent disregard for human rights and justice, and on the other has marred their case for recognition. As her saga proved, and as it touched the emotions of her family and Somalis at large, and undermines the unjustifiable claim of Hargeysa's rulers as an administration for an “Oasis of democracy.”
The recognition of Somaliland by any state would eventually drag Somalia, which seems to be currently moving at least in the right direction, from an era of unforeseen instability, war, and mayhem. The region, which has already been devastated by more than a decade of anarchy, and civil war, might lapse into an elevated state of chaos, which could serve as a safe heaven for criminals, and terrorists. Suppose Somaliland was recognized: First a joy and jubilation mood will kick in through the streets of some major cities in the central part of Somaliland. The easterners will not accept this recognition and will not be part of a sectarian Somaliland. They will not bow down to being seceded from the rest of the republic. Mixed feelings may emerge from the west ( Boorama and Saylac ), some in favor of the recognition, and others against it.
When celebration lets up, the reality on the ground will light up. Somaliland will anticipate securing its borders in order to gain nationhood attributes, particularly in the eastern part. This endeavor will be the defining moment of the survival of Somaliland. Moreover, referencing to the personalities and characteristics accepted in Somaliland leadership, and the trend of their political conduct, the likelihood that they would attempt to seal off their imaginary borders by force is high and most likely that is the path Somaliland will take. Subsequent to this maneuver, easterners will quickly move on to fortify their defenses to ensure that Hargeysa's militia does not approach their towns in the east. The clash between these contending views is nothing other than a civil war that may in the long term involve a show down between Isaaq and Daarood . This could in the long run destabilize the entire region which will be no one's interest.
Furthermore, Somaliland's economy is more primitive and even poorer than that of a “Banana Republic”, and is primarily based on the tariffs collected from the goods that come through Berbera Port and the livestock that is shipped from there. By all accounts, it is a primitive economy. The livestock considerably comes from non-isaaq regions be it inside Somalia or the Somali State of Ethiopia. If Somaliland goes to war against easterners , who populate Puntland , coupled with an inadequate resource, and antagonistic neighbors, rulers of Hargeysa would soon be obligated to scrap for every penny, including looting its own people to spend even higher than the current 45% of its meager revenue on weaponry, logistics, and other services required for sustaining the war front.
This is where opportunity cost does not discriminate and comes in. Apparently, a small fraction of the total revenue of the state will be left for all other expenditures of the government institutions. History of other instances teaches us that warfare is one thing that Somalis know how to pursue, which means that a civil war in Somaliland may be protracted and costly in terms of human life and treasury for all concerned. Let alone Somaliland having the stomach to pacify and bring into line easterners, even America with all its might has not so far succeeded in pacifying the Iraqis. Therefore, for Somaliland to sustain this conflict will not be painless and will definitely cause massive social disruption. This will eventually energize and put in a better stand those opposed to the war and secession and may finally invoke internal struggle within Somaliland. At the end, this would initiate the demise of the notion of Somaliland.
Finally, the old Somali adage holds true here “ Belaayo dibno la qabtay leedahaye dabo la qabto ma laha ”, meaning when loosely translated, it is easier to prevent war than to try to contain it. Thus, Somaliland leaders should not be confused about where the solutions to their problems are: Self-determination of all people and clans must be respected. In order to avoid the prospect of an all out war, Somaliland leaders should abandon their claim of secession of regions based on the concept of Britain's protectorate and admit that they can not accomplish their policy of land grabbing within the framework of self determination. Leaving other people's affairs to them, moving out of their territories, and respecting the importance of peace and interdependence among the communities, would be in the best interest of all.
Ali M. Artan
amacausa@hotmail.com
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